UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS : Master File No. 12-md-02311 ANTITRUST LITIGATION : Honorable Marianne O. Battani

IN RE: WIRE HARNESS : Case No. 2:12-cv-00103-MOB-MKM IN RE: INSTRUMENT PANEL CLUSTERS : Case No. 2:12-cv-00203-MOB-MKM IN RE: FUEL SENDERS : Case No. 2:12-cv-00303-MOB-MKM IN RE: HEATER CONTROL PANELS : Case No. 2:12-cv-00403-MOB-MKM IN RE: OCCUPANT SAFETY RESTRAINT : Case No. 2:12-cv-00603-MOB-MKM

SYSTEMS

IN RE: ALTERNATORS : IN RE: RADIATORS : IN RE: STARTERS : IN RE: SWITCHES : IN RE: S

IN RE: IGNITION COILS : IN RE: MOTOR GENERATORS : IN RE: STEERING ANGLE SENSORS :

IN RE: HID BALLASTS
IN RE: INVERTERS
IN RE: AIR FLOW METERS

IN RE: FUEL INJECTION SYSTEMS IN RE: AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION

FLUID WARMERS

IN RE: VALVE TIMING CONTROL

DEVICES

IN RE: ELECTRONIC THROTTLE BODIES

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO ALL END - PAYOR ACTIONS

Case No. 2:13-cv-00703-MOR-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-00703-MOB-MKM Case No. 2:13-cv-01003-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-01103-MOB-MKM Case No. 2:13-cv-01303-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-01403-MOB-MKM Case No. 2:13-cv-01503-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-01603-MOB-MKM Case No. 2:13-cv-01703-MOB-MKM Case No. 2:13-cv-01803-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-02003-MOB-MKM Case No. 2:13-cv-02203-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-02403-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-02503-MOB-MKM

Case No. 2:13-cv-02603-MOB-MKM

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Class Member, Jim Sciaroni, hereby objects to the proposed class action settlement in the proceeding known as *In Re: Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation* as referenced above and to the appropriate defendant with respect to the unique facts of this objector.

My name is Jim Sciaroni, and I reside at 19 Savannah Avenue, San Anselmo, CA 94960, telephone 415-699-1357. On July 6, 2013, I purchased from Toyota Marin in San Rafael, CA a 2013 Toyota Camry Hybrid, VIN #4T1BD1FK3DU079752 in the amount of \$28,656.00, plus fees, maintenance contract, license, etc. for a total financed amount of \$31,512.38, plus a \$500 deposit, for a total final cost in the amount of \$32,032.38. Attached as Exhibit A is my Loan

Agreement as proof of my purchase during the relevant time period. Therefore, I am a Class Member. I have read the Class Notice and find the settlement unfair as follows:

INSUFFICIENT CLASS DEFINITION

The Court should deny Final Approval because the Class definition is not sufficiently definite. Before a court may certify a class pursuant to Rule 23, "the class definition must be sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class." See Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 5 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.21[1] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1997); see also John v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007). For a class to be sufficiently defined, the court must be able to resolve the question of whether class members are included or excluded from the class by reference to objective criteria. In some circumstances, a reference to damages or injuries caused by particular wrongful actions taken by the defendants will be sufficiently objective criterion for proper inclusion in a class definition. Similarly, a reference to fixed, geographic boundaries will generally be sufficiently objective for proper inclusion in a class definition. Id. (citing Moore's Federal Practice § 23.21[3]). Here, the Class is defined as anyone who at any time from 1998 to 2015: (1) bought or leased a new motor vehicle in the U.S. (not for resale), or (2) paid to replace one or more of the new motor vehicle parts identified in the settlement agreements (not for resale). The Class definition has no reference to damages or injury, or to any specific geographical boundaries other than the entire United States. The Class definition is overbroad and void of any objective criteria that would put an absent Class Member on notice that his or her rights are before the Court. Because the Class definition is not sufficiently definite, the Court should deny Final Approval.

PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS CREATE INCURABLE MANAGEABILITY ISSUES

The Court should deny Final Approval pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)(D) because the proposed Settlements create incurable manageability issues that invite mini-trials and fraudulent claims. The function of the Class Action device is to aggregate individual claims for the purpose of judicial and economic efficiency. In order to do so, the Court must be able to ascertain the Class. *See e.g. Kent v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co.*, 190 F.R.D. 271, 278 (D. Mass. 2000) (ascertainablity is "essential . . . for a court to decide and declare . . . who will share in any recovery"). "It is unfair to absent class members if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by

fraudulent or inaccurate claims." Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3rd Cir. 2013); see also Jenkins v. White Castle Mgmt. Co., No. 12 CV 7273, 2015 WL 832409, *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2015) ("[P]roceeding with an ascertainable class safeguards the rights of both the parties and absent class members."). "A trial court should ensure that class members can be identified without extensive and individualized fact-finding or 'mini-trials,' a determination which must be made at the class certification stage." Carrera at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marcus v. BMW of North America LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594). Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Court cannot reasonably make such a finding.

The Court must gather the requisite information to ascertain and manage the proposed class. *See e.g. Byrd v. Aaron's Inc.*, 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming class certification where there was a "reliable and administratively feasible" method for assessing class membership). "If class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or 'mini-trials,' then a class action is inappropriate." *Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC*, 687 F.3d 583, 593. Here, the Settlement Administrator has no reliable and administratively feasible method for verifying and processing claims, and calculating the amount of the recovery for each Claimant. In fact, there are no records whatsoever to determine class membership.

The Parties cannot rely on Claimants to self-identify as valid Class Members. See e.g. Young v. Nationwide; see also Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 14-11648, 2015 WL 3560722, at *2-4 (11th Cir. June 9, 2015) (unpublished) (holding that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the ascertainability requirement by proposing that class members self-identify, such as with sworn affidavits, without first establishing that self-identification would be "administratively feasible and not otherwise problematic"). The lack of internal data from Defendants means that the only way the Court and the Administrator could confirm class membership is through the use of either claimant affidavits or mini-trials. In both Young v. Nationwide and Rikos v. Procter Gamble, defendants possessed some internal data to confirm valid class member status. See Young at 539; Rikos et al. v. The Procter & Gamble Co., No. 14-4088, 33-35 (6th Cir. Aug 20, 2015). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in both Young and Rikos on the basis that internal data combined with supplemental information, such as receipts and affidavits, cured ascertainability defects. Such is not the case here. Based on the Class definition in the proposed Settlement Agreements, anyone could claim class membership and take advantage of settlement relief, which harms valid Class

Members and dilutes relief. Similarly, some Class Members may want to pursue litigation on their own. For those Class Members, they will not know whether or not these Settlements preclude their claims. Because the proposed Settlements demand individualized procedures to determine class membership, the Class is neither ascertainable nor manageable and mini-trials would be necessary to determine class membership, which would suffocate any aggregate efficiency of the class action mechanism. The inability to determine who is and is not a Class Member also means that individual issues predominate over class issues. Defendants have no internal data to identify class member status and, based on Sixth Circuit precedent, it would be an abuse of discretion to certify the Class and grant final approval. The Court should deny Final Approval because the Court cannot ascertain and manage the proposed Class and because individual issues predominate over Class issues.

CLASS NOTICE FAILS TO MEET DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

The Class Notice does not meet the requirements of due process. It is unfair to subject people to a binding judicial proceeding in which their rights or interests are at stake without telling them about it first. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "Ascertainability . . . allow[s] potential class members to identify themselves for purposes of opting out of a class." Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325 (S.D. III. 2009) (finding that the ascertainability requirement "is necessary to provide the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances") (internal quotation marks omitted); Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004) ("The membership of the class must be ascertainable . . . [b]ecause individual class members must receive the best notice practicable and have an opportunity to opt out "); 1 Rubenstein, supra note 14, § 3:2, at 157 (explaining that some courts impose an ascertainability requirement to facilitate notice). Due process requires the best notice practicable under the circumstances. "Ascertainability is needed for properly enforcing the preclusive effect of final judgment. The class definition must be clear in its applicability so that it will be clear later on whose rights are merged into the judgment, that is, who gets the benefit of any relief and who gets the burden of any loss." Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding unascertainable a class of entities making claims on the estate of an art collector from whom Nazis expropriated an abstract expressionist painting). Ascertainability is supposed to clarify claim preclusion not just for the court, but for potential litigants who need to reach their own conclusion about whether

individual litigation is possible. The Third Circuit noted that "[i]f a class cannot be ascertained in an economical and 'administratively feasible' manner[,] significant benefits of a class action are lost." *Carerra*, 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, the Notice provided to the Class is not the best notice practicable because the Class is not clearly defined so that the public can read it, determine class membership, and decide whether or not to participate in the settlement. The Notice deficiencies harm both absent Class Members that want to participate in the Settlements, and those that would rather request exclusion and file individual actions.

SETTLEMENT RELEASES BAR FUTURE ANTITRUST CLAIMS FOR NEW PRODUCTS

Final Approval should be denied because the settlement releases bar future antitrust claims for new products. Autoliv Settlement Agreement at ¶ 20; Fujikara Settlement Agreement at ¶ 22; Hitatchi Settlement Agreement at ¶ 25; Lear and KL Sales Settlement Agreement at ¶ 18; Nippon Seiki Settlement Agreement at ¶ 20; Panasonic Settlement Agreement at ¶ 21; Sumitomo Settlement Agreement at ¶ 21; TRAD Settlement Agreement at ¶ 23; TRW Settlement Agreement at ¶ 20; Yazaki Settlement Agreements at ¶ 20. The proposed settlement releases run afoul of Rule 23's requirement for common questions of fact and law. A release of future claims is contrary to Rule 23 because neither the Class nor the Court can know what common questions or facts there will be in the future. The risks of future-conduct releases to class members are substantially greater than the risks of past-conduct releases because they do not share common questions of facts and law and, as a result, class members are unable to meaningfully assess the value of the release in comparison to the proposed relief.

The proposed releases also violate the factual predicate rule. Releases of future conduct must apply only to claims arising out of conditions that existed prior to the settlement. *See Moulton v. U.S. S. Corp.*, 581 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2009); *see also Olden v. Gardner*, 294 Fed.Appx. 210, 220 (6th Cir. 2008). In *Moulton*, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the approval of a settlement release that included future conduct because the release applied "only to claims arising out of conditions that existed prior to the settlement." *Moulton* at 350. Based on the Sixth Circuit's analysis however, the release in *Moulton* would have been impermissible had it applied to claims for new equipment. *Id.* Here, the Settlement Releases are not limited to old products. Considering that the Settlements presented here include everyone in the United States that bought or leased a car within the last two decades, the overbroad release of future conduct shields defendants from future antitrust claims

based on new products. The expansive releases could also inhibit future government actions against defendants. The Releases should be limited to Defendants' past conduct and any released claims should be limited to the Class Period and products in existence within the Class Period.

CREATION OF SUBCLASSES MAY CORRECT ISSUES RAISED ABOVE

Plaintiffs may be able to correct the issues identified above through the creation of subclasses. For a purchaser/lessor subclass, the Parties would need to first identify specific makes and models that contained Defendants products. For a replacement subclass, the Court could certify a subclass if Defendants have internal data that can be cross-referenced with Claimant affidavits. A new round of publication notice would be required.

CLASS COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO SHOW FEE REQUEST IS REASONABLE

Class Counsel has not met its burden of demonstrating that its fee request of 30% of the settlement benefits is reasonable. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 132 F.3d 1147, 1152 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The district court should pay particularly close attention to counsel's fee requests, because this money comes from the beneficiaries, not from the defendants."). The complexity of the issues is a significant factor to be considered in making a fee award. If the Court approves the Settlements, which it should not, the Court should limit Class Counsel's fee award to the value attributed to it as opposed to the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2000) (4% fee awarded, in part because counsel benefitted from work done by federal authorities); see also Quantum Health Resources, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (court reduced "benchmark" percentage to 10% due to government's involvement). Class Counsel owes the Department of Justice significant credit; the Department of Justice engaged in significant pre-complaint investigation efforts, prosecuted defendants for their antitrust violations, and secured convictions. The Department of Justice began investigating criminal pricefixing and bid-rigging conspiracies years before Class Counsel filed any suits. In September 2011, the Department of Justice secured its first criminal convictions against Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd. for its role in a criminal price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracy involving the sale of parts to automobile manufacturers. Class Counsel did not file any suit prior to 2012 and used information from the criminal convictions within its complaints. Because the Department of Justice's investigations and convictions paved the way for Class Counsel's actions, the risk and complexity of the actions to Class Counsel was minimal. The Department of Justice's actions dramatically

increased Class Counsel chances of success, thus, Class Counsel's fee request is unreasonable and unsupported. *See, e.g., In re First Databank Antitrust Litigation*, 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 98 (D.D.C. 2002) (reducing fee award due to Federal Trade Commission's work reducing risk and complexity to counsel). The Court should reduce Class Counsel's fee request to 10% because the Department of Justice's legwork significantly reduced Class Counsel's risk bringing these actions and increased its chances of success.

Jim Sciaroni, Objector

Dated: March 25, 2016

Dated: March 25, 2016

By: /s/ Joseph J. Dadich, Esq.

Joseph J. Dadich, Esq. Attorney for Objector

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Troy, MI 48099

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E-Mail: joedadich@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was filed electronically via CM/ECF on March 25, 2016, and served by the same means on all counsel of record.

/s/ Joseph J. Dadich, Esq.

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WARNING: YOUR PRESENT POLICY MAY NOT COVER NOT HAVE FULL COVERAGE, SUPPLEMENTAL DEALER. HOWEVER, UNLESS OTHERWISE SP THE UNPAID BALANCE REMAINING AFTER THE FOR ADVICE ON FULL COVERAGE THAT WIL THE BUYER SHALL SIGN TO ACKNOWLEDGE	CÖVERAGE FOR COLLISION DAMAGE MA ECIFIED, THE COVERAGE YOU OBTAIN TI VEHICLE HAS BEEN REPOSSESSED AND S L PROTECT YOU IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OI	AY BE AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUG HROUGH THE DEALER PROTECTS SOLD. R DAMAGETO YOUR VEHICLE, YOU S	H YOUR INSURANCE AGENT OR THROUG ONLY THE DEALER, USUALLY UP TO TH SHOULD CONTACTYOUR INSURANCE AGE	H THE SELLING HE AMOUNT OF
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Trade-In Payoff Agreement: Seller relied on informa as the "Prior Credit or Lease Balance." You understar	ion from you and/or the lienholder or lessor of y did that the amount quoted is an estimate.	our trade-in vehicle to arrive at the payof	f amount shown in item 6B of the Itemization of	Amount Financed
Seller agrees to pay the payoff amount shown in 6B the excess on demand. If the actual payoff amount is lon the back of this contract, any assignee of this contract.	ess than the amount shown in 6B, Seller will refu	nd to you any overage Seller receives fro	m your prior lienholder or lessor. Except as state	nust pay the Seller d in the "NOTICE"
Buyer Signature X		Co-Buyer Signature X	48-4 m	
Notice to buyer: (1) Do not sign this agr in copy of this agreement. (3) You can p under this agreement, the vehicle may b	epay the full amount due under this	agreement at any time. (4) If y	ou default in the performance of you	ur obligations
If you have a complaint concerning this sale, y Complaints concerning unfair or deceptive p of Motor Vehicles, or any combination thereof. After this contract is signed, the seller may and it is an unfair or deceptive practice for the	ractices or methods by the seller may be not change the financing or payment ter			
Buyer Signature X	THE SALE SALE SALES CONTRACTOR CO	Co-Buyer Signature X	N/A	
The Annual Percentage Rand retain its right to rece			Seller may assign this	contract
THERE IS NO COOLING-OFF PERIOD California law does not provide for a "cooling-off" or smply because you change your mind, decide the vypu may only cancel this contract with the agreems seller to offer a two-day contract cancellation option to certain statutory conditions. This contract cancell or an off-highway motor vehicle subject to identificat	other cancellation period for vehicle sales. There ehicle costs too much, or wish you had acquire ent of the seller or for legal cause, such as frau on used vehicles with a purchase price of less tha ation option requirement does not apply to the s	efore, you cannot later cancel this contra d a different vehicle. After you sign belov id. However, California law does require an forty thousand dollars (\$40,000), subje aale of a recreational vehicle, a motorcycl	CONFIRM I HAI BEFORE YOU SIGNED I H GAVE IT TO YOU, AND YOU WERE FREE WAY BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONTRACT, ARBITRATION PROVISION ON THE REVER E, SIGNING BELOW YOU CONFIRM THAT	IIS CONTRACT, WE E TO TAKE IT AND YOU HAVE READ INCLUDING THE RSE SIDE, BEFORE YOU RECEIVED A
Buyer Signature X	Date	Co-Buyer Signature X	Date -	
Co-Buyers and Other Owners — A co-buyer is does not have to pay the debt. The other owner	a person who is responsible for paying the	he entire debt. An other owner is a		vehicle but
Other Owner Signature X		Address		
GUARANTY: To induce us to sell the vehicle on this contract, each Guarantor must pay it w complete defense to Guarantor's demand for re payments; (2) give a full or partial release to ar relating to this contract or extend the contract. I Guarantor waives notice of acceptance of this Guarantor waives notice of acceptance of this Guarantor waives notice.				
Guarantor X	Date Date	Guarantor X	Date	31/4
Address		Address		4.3
Seller Signs	Date 19 The Park	By X	Title	VANAG ET
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FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OF THIS FORM. CONSULT YOU	I OWN LEGAL COUNSEL.		R/TRUTH IN LENDING COPY	